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Chapter 4
Monsters, Laws of Nature, and Teleology 
in Late Scholastic Textbooks
Silvia Manzo
By revealing the precariousness of the stability to which life has 
habituated us -yes, merely habituated, even though we have 
turned this habit into a law —themonster bestows upon the 
repetition of species, upon morphological regularity, and upon 
successful structuration a value all the more eminent in that we 
can now grasp their contingency.
Canguilhem (2008) 135
In the period of emergence of early modern science, “monsters” or individuals with 
physical congenital anomalies were considered as rare events which required spe-
cial explanations entailing assumptions about the laws of nature. This concern with 
monsters was shared by representatives of the new science and Late Scholastic 
authors of university textbooks. This paper will reconstruct the main theses of the 
treatment of monsters in Late Scholastic textbooks, by focusing on the question as 
to how their accounts conceived nature’s regularity and teleology. It shows that they 
developed a naturalistic teratology in which, in contrast to the naturalistic explana-
tions usually offered by the new science, finality was at central stage. This general 
point does not impede our noticing that some authors were closer to the views 
emerging in the Scientific Revolution insofar as they conceived nature as relatively 
autonomous from God and gave a relevant place to efficient secondary causation. In 
this connection, this paper suggests that the concept of the laws of nature developed 
by the new science – as exception less regularities–transferred to nature’s regularity 
the “strong” character that Late Scholasticism attributed to finality and that the 
decline of the Late Scholastic view of finality played as an important concomitant 
factor permitting the transformation of the concept of laws of nature.
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4.1  Introduction
Western reflection upon monsters originated in ancient times, maintained its rele-
vance throughout the Middle Ages, and flourished in the sixteenth and the seven-
teenth centuries. The Aristotelian “scientific” and “naturalist” teratological tradition 
was integral to the heyday of literature about monsters in the Renaissance and early 
modern periods. It dealt with monsters as natural events to be explained by natural 
philosophy or physics.1 However, scarce scholarly attention has been given to the 
treatment of monsters provided by Late Scholastic textbooks, which were the main 
vehicles of the Aristotelian doctrines at that time.2 As is well known, Late 
Scholasticism was an eclectic and widespread manifestation of Aristotelianism that 
dominated university education particularly in the late sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, acting as the backdrop against which some developments of the new sci-
ence and philosophy by central figures like Descartes, Galileo, Hobbes, Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Newton, and others took place.3
While departing from the Aristotelian framework, Late Scholastic treatments of 
monsters also made use of a wide range of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance 
sources such as Themistius, Simplicius, Pliny, Plutarch, Cicero, Galen, Augustine, 
Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, Averroes, Johann Boehme, Marsilio Ficino, Ambroise 
Paré, and Martin Weinrich, among others. They were typically not reduced to the 
Aristotelian framework, but varied and altered it, introducing further elements, dif-
ferent emphases, and new notions. As a result, this literature reassessed, modified, 
and systematized some of the concepts around which monsters were discussed at 
the time and continued to be discussed for the next two centuries: the ends and the 
fallibility of nature; the contrast between supernatural, contranatural, and preter-
natural; the notions of impeded and impeding natures; the relation between particu-
lar and universal natures; and the role of chance and divine providence. However, 
though sharing this common background, Late Scholastic claims about monsters 
did not constitute a completely homogeneous body of knowledge: they evolved 
across several subtly different veins and differed in emphases.
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the main theses about monsters in some 
Protestant and Catholic Late Scholastic textbooks, by focusing on the question as to 
how their accounts conceived nature’s regularity and teleology. While previous 
studies had noted the ways in which nature’s regularity and teleology were thought 
in the late sixteenth century, this paper points out that both notions were strongly 
intertwined in the Late Scholastic view of nature in general and of teratology in 
particular. Hence, teratology constitutes a fecund case study to analyze how the 
laws and the ends of nature were thought at the time. By exploring this scarcely 
studied topic in these influential texts, this study seeks, on the one hand, to contrib-
ute to our knowledge of Late Scholastic views on monsters and, by these means, to 
1 Céard (1996); Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park (1998).
2 Exceptions can be found in Des Chene (1996, 21–22, 203–210) and Guidi (2012).
3 Reif (1964, 1969) 17–32 and Schmitt (1983a).
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help us understand more fully sixteenth- and seventeenth-century teratology. On the 
other hand, this study sheds some light on the history of the early modern concept(s) 
of laws of nature, in analyzing the way in which Late Scholasticism conceived 
exceptions to nature’s regularity within a teleological framework. A better under-
standing of Late Scholastic views on nature’s regularity and teleology will contrib-
ute (in further studies) to the more accurate delineation of the innovations introduced 
by modern concepts of the laws of nature which comprised, on the one hand, differ-
ent ideas of regularity and, on the other, challenges to teleology.
This paper will show that Late Scholastic manuals endorsed a naturalistic 
approach that, in contrast to the naturalistic explanations usually offered by the new 
science, gave a prominent place to finality as a necessary component of the casual 
account of monsters. Certainly, most manuals left aside the portentous account of 
monsters like the newer teratology did. However, unlike the latter, the rejection of 
the portentous interpretation of monsters did not led Late Scholastic authors to 
exclude goals from their explanations. This general point does not impede to remark 
some differences among the Late Scholastic corpus. Some authors, like Toledo, 
Pereira, and Burgersdijck, were closer to the views emerging in the Scientific 
Revolution insofar as they conceived nature as relatively more autonomous from 
God’s control and gave a relevant place to efficient secondary causation. To a certain 
extent, the role they conceded to secondary efficient causation collided with the 
strong teleological pattern of nature characteristic of the Late Scholastic overall 
view of nature. Precisely tensions inside the Late Scholastic account at least in part 
motivated the abandonment of teleology, or at least of the “strong” finality endorsed 
by it. In this connection, I will suggest that the concept of the laws of nature – as 
exceptionless regularities–developed by the new science transferred to nature’s reg-
ularity the “strong” character formerly attributed to finality. By this move, the laws 
of nature were transformed from “weak” to “strong” regularities.
This paper is organized into seven sections. After the introductory first section, 
in the second section I provide a brief justification and an account of the contexts 
and authors of the textbooks selected for this study. In the following section, I offer 
a short description of the broad metaphysical views concerning regularity and tele-
ology with respect to monsters assumed by this literature. There, I introduce into the 
definitions of weak regularity and strong teleology, which I will use in my interpre-
tation. Section four discusses the characterization of monsters as nature’s mistakes 
and preternatural events admitted by what I call “weak” laws of nature. In the fifth 
section, I show the different strategies developed to make the existence of monsters 
compatible with what I consider to be a notion of nature’s “strong” finality, by 
means of conceptual tools such as particular and universal natures, impeded and 
impending natures, and different sorts of ends. The next section deals with the views 
of our authors about the interpretation of monsters as portents. The last section 
addresses the question of the accidental character of monsters and their relation to 
chance and God’s providence. In the conclusion, I draw some general remarks about 
how nature’s regularity and teleology were conceived by the textbooks and suggest 
in rough terms how they are related to more modern views.
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4.2  The Textbooks: Authors and Contexts
This study will explore the natural philosophy manuals widely read in arts and 
medicine faculties of Post-Reformation universities in which the treatment of mon-
sters is more deeply developed.4 The influence of Catholic commentaries was per-
vasive in Protestant textbook authors, and they shared many views.5 Not surprisingly, 
the treatment of monsters in Catholic manuals here selected (mainly those by Toledo 
and the Coimbrans) was read attentively and much of the time followed by Protestant 
authors. This broad agreement in large part stemmed from the fact that the notions 
involved in their discussions on teratology did not touch any point linked to the 
Post-Reformation theological controversies.
As for the Catholic representatives, our survey will consider, on the one hand, 
textbooks by Jesuit authors, which were primarily intended for use at the colleges 
and universities linked to the Society of Jesus. The general orientation of the Society 
was a modified Thomistic Aristotelianism, which exerted great influence across 
European Catholic and Protestant universities.6 The earliest Jesuit texts of our selec-
tion were composed by Francisco Toledo (1532–1596) and Benito Pereira (1535–
1610), the most influential professors at the early Collegio Romano. Before 
becoming a Jesuit, Toledo studied at Salamanca under the Spanish Dominican 
Domingo de Soto (1494–1560). Besides the Thomist penchant, his commentary on 
Aristotle’s Physics (1573) – which combines summaries of Aristotle’s texts with 
quaestiones – also took into consideration the ancient commentaries and the Arab 
tradition. Pereira published in 1576 De communibus omnium rerum naturalium 
principiis et affectionibus, a textbook organized in 15 books which covers system-
atically Aristotle’s natural philosophy.7 He had studied at the Collegio Romano and 
became professor there in 1556. His exposition favored the Thomist interpretation 
over the Greek and Latin traditions but did not exclude nominalist and Scotist views. 
In addition, he was more sympathetic to Averroism than other Jesuits from the 
Collegio Romano. In his textbook Pereira is intending to give a naturalistic account 
of the “principles” of nature, which are thought to be the real causes of things.8
Probably, the most influential Jesuit textbooks were those composed by the 
Portuguese College of Arts at Coimbra, which commented on several of Aristotle’s 
works and produced a philosophical course encompassing logic, physics, biology, 
and ethics. These manuals became the reference works of Late Scholasticism during 
the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries not only in Europe but also in South 
4 It goes without saying that it is far beyond the scope of this paper to exhaust the huge amount of 
natural philosophy textbooks circulating at that time. It is hoped that the textbooks discussed here 
can be considered to be representative of the whole.
5 Reif (1964) ch. 1; Schmitt (1983a) 149.
6 Ariew (2003) 162–169.
7 Most bibliographies have established that De communibus came out first in 1562, but recently 
Blum (2006) 280, 295 n. 3, has challenged this date by arguing that it first appeared in 1576.
8 On Pereira’s relation to Averroism, see Blum (2006) 280–284. See Wallace (2000) 228–229; 
Blum (2006) passim; Lohr (2000) 606–609.
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America and China. Compared to their colleagues from the Collegio Romano, the 
Coimbrans were more conservative.9 The commentary on Physics (1592) was writ-
ten by Manuel de Góis (1543–97), who studied at the Jesuit College of Montego. 
The most important issues of each chapter are subsequently discussed in long series 
of quaestiones which offer a detailed and insightful account of precedent and con-
temporary interpretations, making ample use of a very wide range of ancient, medi-
eval, and contemporary sources.10
The commentary on the Physics (1605) by the Spanish Jesuit Antonio Rubio 
(1548–1615) is very much indebted to the Coimbran and Toledo’s commentaries. 
Rubio, who had studied at Alcalá and entered the Society in 1659, taught from 1576 
to 1599 in the Jesuit Province of Nueva España (Mexico) and produced commentar-
ies on several of Aristotle’s works, later published in Europe, and read in several 
universities.11 Another source followed by Rubio in his treatment of monsters is the 
Disputationes Metaphysicae (1597) of the Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), a 
widely read commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which incidentally dealt with 
some questions related to monsters.12
On the other hand, a different Catholic approach is to be found in Eustachius a 
Sancto Paulo (1573–1640), who had studied at the Sorbonne and became professor 
there, before entering the Cistercian congregation of the Feuillants. Eustachius was 
an influential figure of the French Catholic revival, whom Descartes held in high 
esteem. As other authors educated at Paris at the time, Eustachius was more inclined 
toward Scotist positions. His work Summa philosophiae quatripartita de rebus 
dialecticis, moralibus, physicis, et metaphysicis (1609) was widely read both in 
Catholic and Protestant circles. It is a systematic exposition covering the whole 
philosophy and excluding mathematics. Unlike the Jesuit textbooks above 
mentioned, this manual contains few discussions of precedent contemporary 
interpretations.13
As for the Protestant textbooks, this essay will deal with works by Bartholomeus 
Keckermann (1571–1609), Johannes Magirus (d. 1596), Franco Burgersdijck 
(1590–1635), and John Case (1540–1600). Both Keckermann and Magirus were 
educated at Protestant universities, typically inspired by the Philippist educational 
program initiated at the University of Wittenberg. While the first Protestant text-
books were composed at Wittenberg by an early supporter of Luther’s revolt, 
Johannes Velcurio (1490–1534), it was Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560) who 
became the leading intellectual figure of Lutheran reformed universities.14 
Keckermann belonged to a later Protestant generation and was one of the most read 
textbook authors across Europe. Born to a Danzig Calvinist family, in 1590 he 
9 Wallace (2000) 229.
10 de Carvalho (2011) 1–13.
11 Osorio Romero (1988) 9–34.
12 On Suarez, see Lohr (2000) 611–617.
13 Ariew (2003) 164–169.
14 Kusukawa (2008) 111. On the fate of Velcurio’s works and his influence on the Lutheran world, 
see ead. (1995) 109–112.
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entered the University of Wittenberg, where he was introduced to the Aristotelian 
philosophy through the interpretation and method of Paduan Aristotelianism as 
developed by Jacopo Zabarella (1533–89). When Calvinist students were expelled 
from Saxon universities, he moved to Heidelberg. As professor at Heidelberg and 
Danzig, Keckermann became a convinced Aristotelian very much engaged with a 
pedagogical reform. He developed a new method of exposition of Aristotle’s thesis, 
which was applied to the whole range of disciplines in a 3-year course. His treat-
ment of natural philosophical issues appears in Systema physicum (1610).15
A similar mix of Zabarellian and Protestant education was received by Johannes 
Magirus, who in 1591 became professor of natural philosophy, after having studied 
at Padua under Zabarella. Later, he received a doctoral degree in medicine at the 
Philippist University of Marburg (1585). His natural philosophical work, Physiologia 
peripatetica, posthumously published in 1597, was read not only in Marburg but 
also in Cambridge and Harvard. It is a compact exposition which roughly follows 
the usual order of topics, like Keckermann’s. Between 1605, when the University of 
Marburg was converted to Calvinism, and 1624, when it came back to Lutheran 
orthodoxy, Magirus’s textbooks took part in the conciliatory attitude toward philo-
sophical and theological issues, which characterized this institution under the influ-
ence of Rudolph Goclenius (1547–1628).16
Another influential Protestant figure, particularly in Northern Europe, was the 
Dutch Franco Burgersdijck (or Burgersdijk), who studied at the University of 
Leiden and the Protestant Academy of Saumur in France. He was appointed profes-
sor in Leiden to fill one of the vacancies produced by the anti-Arminian purge pro-
moted by the Synod of Dort. As professor, he transformed the teaching of philosophy 
into a discipline independent from theology and philology. His textbooks on natural 
philosophy, Idea philosophiae naturalis (1622) and Collegium physicum (1632), 
were widely used in Protestant universities until the end of the seventeenth century. 
The first one is an epitome of Aristotle’s Physics which selects definitions and con-
troversies from expositions by Zabarella, Toledo, Pereira, and the Coimbrans, with 
the aim of simplifying the learning of physics. The second one is a longer and more 
original exposition organized in disputationes on several selected topics.17
What Burgersdijck represented for Dutch universities, John Case represented for 
the British scene. Case took his BA (1567), MA (1572), and MD (1589) from Saint 
John’s College (Oxford) and was a fellow there between 1572 and 1574. Though he 
had been accused of being a secret Catholic, more recent studies suggest that is not 
possible to align him with a particular religion. Moreover, Case was equally attached 
both to loyal Anglican theologians and to recusants.18 This paper, however, will 
show that Case endorsed a staunch providentialism, akin to that found in English 
15 Freedmann (1997); Hotson (2002) 43–47 and (2007) 136–156; Mack (2011) 186–92.
16 Rogers (1988) 10 and Flower (1988) 23; Wallace (2000) 230; Kusukawa (2008) 117; Maclean 
(2012) 275 n. 56.
17 Rüstow (1973) 14–33; Krop (2011) 60–62.
18 Schmitt (1983b) 114–116 and n. 41. See Copenhaver and Schmitt (1992) 124, and in general 
121–126.
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Protestantism, and, accordingly, a commitment to the interpretation of monsters as 
portents –exceptional as compared to the rest of authors of our corpus. Educated in 
Humanism and Scholasticism, Case developed an open-minded and eclectic 
Aristotelianism. He composed several pedagogical works on several matters. Two 
of his works, Ancilla philosophiae and Lapis philosophicus – both printed in Oxford 
in 1599 – were meant to provide expositions of Aristotle’s Physics: the first one as 
a very brief introduction for beginners and the second one as a more original and 
detailed exposition, including discussions of commentaries by Toledo, Pereira, and 
the Coimbrans.19
4.3  The Metaphysical Assumptions: Weak Regularity 
and Strong Finality
The notions of regularity and teleology assumed by the selected manuals in their 
thought on monsters can be traced back to doctrines originally introduced in 
Aristotle’s loci classici on the issue. The classification of biological heredity pre-
sented in Generation of Animals places monsters in the class of offspring who do 
not resemble their parents. In monstrous births, the natural process does not follow 
its regular course. Aristotle points out specific circumstances to explain why mon-
sters are born: the motions proceeding from the male are not dominant; the space 
available in the uterus is insufficient; the material contributed by the mother is defi-
cient; etc.20 In addition, he establishes that monsters are exceptional beings παρὰ 
φύσιν (i.e., contrary to nature or beyond nature),21 but he also makes it clear that 
they do not go against all kinds of nature, but only against a certain kind of nature 
(i.e., against the nature of the specific form of the parents). Moreover, he claims that 
even that which is contrary to nature is in a certain sense in accordance with nature, 
since monsters arise whenever the “formal” cause fails to dominate the “material” 
cause.22 This situation can take place only among those things which occur for the 
most part and which may occur contrary to that, but not in those things which occur 
always and by necessity.23
This last point is essential to understand the medieval and Late Scholastic 
approaches. Like Aquinas, the textbooks conceive that sublunary nature admits 
exceptions to its regular course, since its regularity consists in what happens always 
or for the most part (aut semper aut plerunque).24 This way of characterizing the 
regular course of nature – which refers to nature as process – is what for brevity’s 
19 Schmitt (1983b) 74–76; 152–153; 156–159.
20 Aristotle (2000) IV, 3–4, 769 b10-770b27.
21 As for the different interpretations and translations received by the expression παρὰ φύσιν, see 
p. 10 of the pdf manuscript (there is no page number in proof).
22 Aristotle (2000) IV, 4, 770b15–17. See Rossi (2011) 268.
23 Aristotle (2000) IV 4, 770b10–18.
24 Daston and Park (1998) 120–122. See Aquinas (1975), lib. 3, ch. 99, n. 9.
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sake I will call the “weak” sense of regularity: a view according to which the regular 
course of nature can be interrupted and admits exceptions.25
On the other hand, in Physics Aristotle refers to monsters when dealing with final 
causes and defines them as mistakes of nature in the attainment of its end.26 To 
Aristotle the issue of teleology was directly related to nature’s regularity: what 
occurs always or for the most part must occur on account of some end. If the natural 
world were disordered, every natural occurrence would be a consequence of chance. 
Hence, acts which fall short of their ends look like anomalies to the omnipresent 
finality reflected by the weak regularity of nature’s order: they appear to be counter-
examples which require ad hoc explanation.27
Unlike the Aristotelian biological description of monstrosity in Generation of 
Animals, which did not challenge Christian tenets, the definition provided in Physics 
did entail a conflict with them. From the Physics definition – which refers to nature 
as producer –28 there follows a notion of nature as fallible, which not only puts at 
risk the conviction that nature always, not just for the most part, acts on account of 
an end. This notion also goes against the figure of the Christian God governing and 
controlling nature, which the textbook authors – regardless of their religious affilia-
tion – aimed at defending. What for brevity’s sake I will call “strong” finality is the 
standard view that everything in nature occurs on account of an end, so that every 
natural change is a directed change.29
This does not entail, however, that regular ends in nature are by themselves ines-
capable. In fact, monsters are precisely the sort of events showing that sometimes 
regular and primary ends are not attained. In fact, as we shall see, textbook authors 
explained monstrous generation by claiming that since the regular end of generation 
is unattained, another end replaced it. The sense in which finality can be qualified as 
strong refers, therefore, to the idea that, after all, nature always acts toward one 
(regular and frequent) end or another (irregular and rare) end. It comes as little sur-
prise, then, that all the textbook treatments dwell on the question “whether nature 
intends monsters.”30
25 Daston and Park (1998) 14, 110, had referred to this kind of regularity in terms of “habits” or 
“customs” of nature. See also Maclean (2000) 233–235; id. (2007) 268–271; id. (2008) 33–36. On 
customs and laws of nature, see also Steinle (2001) 77–98; Daston (2004).
26 Aristotle (1998) II, 8, 199b4.
27 On the idea of monsters as counterexamples, see Des Chene (1996) 172.
28 The hermeneutical distinction between nature as process and nature as producer is inspired by 
Maclean (2007) 247.
29 See Des Chene (1996) ch. 6.
30 This concern with teleology was commonplace in Late Renaissance literature on monsters 
inspired in Aristotle. See, for instance, Hanafi (2000) 27–33.
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4.4  Nature’s Mistakes, the Preternatural, and “Weak” Laws 
of Nature
The image of monsters as mistakes of nature, along with the assumption that nature 
is fallible and deviates from its ordinary course, made its way throughout the Middle 
Ages at least until the eighteenth century.31 The textbooks furthered this note by 
associating the existence of monsters with nature’s liability to error. Pereira puts this 
idea very clearly: “it is necessary that what is fallible (defectibile) sometimes fails; 
hence exist the reason and the origin of monsters.”32 In other words, as Rubio says, 
something is called “monster” for being a “defect.”33 This association became an 
essential mark of monstrosity in the standard definition of monsters (apparently of 
Jesuit origin) across Catholic and Protestant textbooks: a monster is a natural effect 
that degenerates from the correct and habitual disposition which is consonant with 
the species (“naturalis effectus a recta et solita secundum speciem dispositione 
degenerans”).34 Along the same line, Magirus defines monsters as “deviations and 
flaws” of the nature of an individual that deviates from its end through the interven-
tion of an impediment.35
In addition, in Protestant textbooks are to be found definitions which describe 
monsters as bodies whose defective arrangement indicate some kind of irregularity 
in their figure. Thus, Velcurio writes that monsters are “natural bodies that do not 
have their members correctly set, nor do they have the usual proportion between 
their parts.”36 Similarly, Keckermann defines them as “living natural bodies” that 
have some peculiar defect, a certain flaw (peccatum) or an immense deviation 
(aberratio enormis) from nature.37 In the same vein, Burgersdijck says that a mon-
ster is a “living body much degenerating from the lawful and natural conformation 
of its members.” As we shall later, these Protestant definitions do not entail that the 
31 Daston and Park (1998) 201–214; Bates (2005a) 142; Guidi (2012) 61–108; Davies (2013) 
49–75.
32 Pereira (1585) lib. 9, ca. x, 528.
33 Rubio (1629) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. unica, 284.
34 The definition was apparently coined by Toledo (1580) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. xiii, fol. 76r. It appears 
later – sometimes with slight variations– in Conimbricenses (1594) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. v, art. I, 339; 
Burgersdijck (1645) dis. III, thesis 13, 17; Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (1647) Pars Physica, trac. ii, 
qu. ii, 147; Rubio (1629) lib. 2, ca, ix, qu. unica, 283; Keckermann (1623) lib. 5, ca. iii, 595; Case 
(1600) lib. 2, ca. viii, 345. In some cases, the genus of the definition is not “natural effect” but 
“natural birth” (partus naturalis) or “natural living being” (vivens naturale). See also Chauvin 
(1692) sub voce. Some authors held more or less explicitly that monsters occur only in living 
beings (plants and animals) as contrasted with unanimated beings. See Pereira (1585) lib. 9, ca. x, 
529.
35 Magirus (1646) lib. 1, ca. iii, 55.
36 Velcurio (1558) lib. I, ca. x, 39: “corpora naturalia, quae non habent iustum situm membrorum, 
neque consuetam Naturae proportionem partium.” The same definition is provided by Goclenius 
(1613) 708.
37 Keckermann (1623) lib. 5, ca. iii, 594.
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irregularity visible in the bodies of the offspring points out an irregularity of their 
formal causes, since what is defective is only the individual body.38
Rather than as pure and simple effects, monsters were thought of as defects for 
which nature is solely responsible. From a Christian perspective, it was impossible 
to claim that God is the cause of a defect. As the Coimbran explanation of the stan-
dard definition argues, monsters are not supernatural events produced by God and 
should not be confused with divine miracles. Even if occasionally the effects pro-
duced by man that defy the rules of a particular art are called “monsters,” this term 
is only applied to them in analogy with nature. In sum, the sole cause of monsters is 
nature, and, accordingly, they are said to be natural.39 Nonetheless, insofar as mon-
sters are not usual but rare events, they are more specifically conceived as preter-
natural effects. This reading draws on a passage from Generation of Animals, where 
Aristotle presents monsters as παρὰ φύσιν individuals,40 a Greek expression that 
can be translated as “contrary to nature” (contra naturam) or as “beyond nature” 
(praeter naturam).41
Certainly, Christian readers of Aristotle were reluctant to accept that generation 
could be contrary to nature, since nature was the work of God and nothing could 
operate against his power and will. The thirteenth-century first Latin translation of 
Generation of Animals by William of Moerbecke renders παρὰ φύσιν as praeter 
naturam.42 This tendency remained in later Renaissance translators,43 like Theodore 
Gaza, responsible for the most widespread Latin version of Aristotle’s treatises in 
natural history at that time, probably consulted by the textbook authors.44 Against 
this background, John Case, for instance, characterizes monsters as errors qua 
effects. But, at the same time, he emphasizes the fact that in monsters the error lies 
in the particular nature qua cause.45 They constitute “imperfect acts,” resulting from 
38 Burgersdijck (1643) dis. XXIV, a. 2, i., 261; ib., q. xi, 249.
39 Conimbricenses (1594) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. v, art. ii, 339. The Coimbran commentary draws on 
Toledo’s explanation of the standard definition, Toledo (1580) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. xiii, fol. 76r.
40 Aristotle (2000) IV, 4, 770b10–18.
41 Maclean (2007) 252–256 notes that expressions like “praeter naturam,” “contra naturam,” and 
“secundum naturam” were intended in different ways in Renaissance medical discourse. The same 
goes, I would suggest, for the literature explored in this paper.
42 Aristotle (2000) IV, 4, 770b10–17; Aristoteles Latinus (1966) 135.
43 As far as I know the only exception appears in Michael Scotus’ thirteenth-century Latin transla-
tion of the Arabic Kitāb al-Hayawān (“Book of Animals”) which contains parts of De generatione 
animalium. Peck’s English translation of 778a 5–9 says: “things occurring contrary to Nature 
(παρὰ φύσιν).” Scotus’ translation of this passage: “res contra naturam.” (Aristotle, 1992, 481–
483, my italics).
44 Editio princeps: Aristotle (1476). Reprinted in the monumental Giunta edition, Aristotelis Opera 
cum Averrois commentariis (Aristotle, 1560) IV. Gaza’s reading of De generatione animalium, IV, 
4, 770b10–18 says: “monstrosum est enim res praeter naturam. Sed praeter eam, quae magna ex 
parte sit, nam praeter eam, quae semper et necesario est, nihil fit.”, Aristotelis Stagiritae libri 
omnes ad animalium cognitionem attinentes, cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem (Aristotle, 
1962) VI, fol. 243r. On the Latin translations of Aristotle’s biological treatises and the high impact 
of Gaza’s translation, see Beullens and Gotthelf (2007) and Perfetti (2000) 12–28.
45 On the notion of particular nature, see p. 13 of the pdf manuscript proof. There are no page num-
bers in the proof.
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the “preternatural potency” of matter. In turn, they are distinguished from “violent 
acts,” that is, acts “against nature,” which are caused by an external cause which 
deprives the nature of the thing of its own potency and leads it to corruption.46 As it 
can be seen here and in other authors like Pereira, etc., matter’s recalcitrance was 
often alleged as one cause, often the principal cause, of the generation of monsters. 
This very idea comes back to Aristotle’s view that monsters arise whenever the 
“formal” cause fails to dominate the “material” cause.
How are these preternatural events related to nature’s taxonomy? Do they consti-
tute species on their own? Or are they just individual cases? Textbook authors main-
tain that monsters are exceptional cases within a species, but do not constitute 
species by themselves. Each species has a disposition and a conformation of its 
members. When individuals are born that do not follow this rule, the result is a mon-
ster which can be associated with a certain species. In monstrosities, the degenera-
tion of the species is only partial, since an offspring resembles its parents to some 
degree: an olive is not generated from a man, neither is an animal generated from a 
plant.47 Monstrosities are derivatives upon a preexistent order against which they 
can be recognized and measured as aberrations. Otherwise, aberrations would not 
be possible at all, since there would be no given standard to which to be compared.48 
Hence, since not every “irregularity” constitutes a monstrosity, it is extremely 
important to observe carefully how far individuals deviate from the preexisting 
order. The treatment by Keckermann is particularly insightful on this point. His 
exposition on monsters is included in book V, devoted to living bodies. After estab-
lishing that living bodies can be regular or irregular, he claims that irregularity is a 
matter of degrees, depending on how far a body moves away from “nature’s order 
and perfection.” While the “less irregular” remissions or intensions of nature 
(remissio et intensio) are not monstrous – as in the cases of women, giants, and 
pygmies – the “more irregular” and greater deviations (aberrationes) are monstrous, 
such as a two- headed animal.49
Given their endorsement to the idea of weak regularity, though some textbooks 
talk about the regularity and order of nature in terms of “laws” or “rules,” they do 
not regard them as exception less.50 The Coimbran commentary explains that a 
monster is “a deviation from the order and law that an end prescribes to the opera-
tions of nature and in accordance to which nature itself operates” (“deflexio aliqua 
ab ordine ac lege, quam naturae operibus praescribit finis, propter quem natura ipsa 
 operatur”). In other words, it is a defect which digresses “from a law of nature”51 or 
46 Case (1600b) ca. v, 34.
47 Toledo (1580) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. xiii, fol. 76r.
48 On the normative character of regularity in Late Scholastics philosophy, see Des Chene (1996) 
21–22.
49 Keckermann (1623) lib. 5, ca. iii, 595–600. On the status of giants and dwarfs in this regard, see 
Conimbricenses (1594) lib 2, ca. ix, qu. v, art. ii, 339–340; Burgersdijck (1643) dis. XXV, 265; 
Rubio (1629) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. unica, 283; Case (1600a) lib. 2, ca. viii, 345.
50 The same can be found in medical texts of the sixteenth century. See Bates (2005b) 14–15.
51 Conimbricenses (1594) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. v, art. ii, 339; 342.
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is “beyond its common course or rule [regula].”52 Rubio makes the same point. A 
natural effect is called a monster insofar as it fails to achieve the perfection that 
would have occurred in accordance with the usual laws (consuetas leges) that nature 
keeps in its actions. In his opinion, giants and pygmies are not monsters, because 
they are not generated “beyond the laws of nature, but in accordance with them,” 
being effects of the peculiar physical properties – extreme fecundity and sterility, 
respectively – of the land where they were born.53 When monsters are born, Case 
writes, we become astonished because second causes invert the usual order and 
shake the laws (legibusque concussis).54
Within this worldview, preternatural fallibility is possible insofar as nature has 
purposes: only what has a purpose can fail in the accomplishment of it. A fortiori, 
the fallibility derived from the purposive character of nature, entails that there is no 
guarantee that the regular course of nature is always maintained. The weak regularity 
of nature is therefore possible only if nature’s fallibility and hence its purposiveness 
are assumed. This entails, in addition, that, being fragile, the laws of nature lack 
necessity and permit exceptions. Indeed, when a preternatural deviation from the 
ordinary course of nature occurs, the law is not violated strictu sensu, since the 
deviation is a possibility envisaged by the very notion of law. Rather than violations, 
monstrous deviations are exceptions: irregular outcomes perfectly admissible in the 
course of nature.
4.5  “Strong” Finality and Diversity of Ends
The textbooks devised different ways to argue that, albeit errors, monsters are com-
patible with nature’s omnipresent teleology, so nature maintains its purposive char-
acter. The authors deployed a number of conceptual tools to help deal with this 
dilemma. They included the sheer number of teleologies in nature, a distinction 
between universal and particular natures, and a distinction between “impeding” and 
“impeded” natures (also called impeding and impeded causes).
As for the diversity of ends, first it should be noted that Late Scholasticism 
thought of the immediate ends of nature as changes in two different senses. On the 
one hand, an end is an intended state, the terminus ad quem of one operation, the 
attainment of which coincides with the cessation of change. On the other hand, an 
end is the beneficiary of the operation, that is, the thing for whose benefit the change 
occurs, which may or may not be the subject of the intended state. If someone takes 
a pill to restore her health, the condition to be achieved is the health, and the 
 beneficiary is the person. Both are ends of the same change in different respects. As 
we shall see, the textbooks agree that monsters are ends, since they are termini ad 
52 Keckermann (1623) lib. 1, ca. i, 4.
53 Rubio (1629) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. unica, 284; ib., ca. viii, qu. unica, 281 he talks of “regulae 
consuetae.”
54 Case (1600a) lib. 2, ca, viii, 346.
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quem of some generative processes but diverge on determining what or who the 
beneficiaries of such generation are. In so doing they appeal to different kinds of 
ends which become unified by subsumption: individual ends, collective ends, and 
cosmic ends are subsumed to one another, and all subsumed to the ultimate end, 
God.55 Behind this hierarchy of ends, one way or another the time-honored maxim 
keeps valid: nature always acts toward an end. Such a maxim was entangled with 
the conviction that a beneficiary always corresponds with the intended states of 
natural changes. Both claims were at the core of strong finality.
Besides assuming several senses and kinds of ends, the manuals appealed to the 
distinction between causa universalis or natura universalis, which had several 
senses depending on the context.56 Usually the plural form causae/naturae univer-
sales referred to the celestial virtues (heavenly substances) in contrast with 
causae/naturae particulares, which embraced all sublunary agents submitted to 
them. However, the singular form causa/natura universalis exceptionally meant 
God as the first cause, the universe, or the species of sublunary particular agents – 
generally in biological and medical texts.57 As we shall see, in the causal explana-
tion of monsters by “universal causes,” the manuals usually intended the heavens 
and, by “particular causes,” the parents or the species, of which monsters are effects.
Another conceptual distinction was related to the idea that in monstrous genera-
tion the regular end of generation is obstructed by some kind of impediment.58 This 
very idea was derived from Aristotle’s view that in sublunary nature things occur 
regularly “if nothing impedes it.”59 Accordingly, to explain monsters in terms of 
impediments, Late Scholastic authors called “impeding” nature (or cause) the nature 
that impedes the attainment of the regular end (for instance, small uterus, excess of 
matter, etc.) and “impeded” nature (or cause) the agent of the generation (usually 
the parents) which is obstructed by such impediment in the attainment of its 
purpose.
All such concepts played a crucial role in explaining the teleological sense of 
monsters. All of them – by implication at least– would agree that ultimately all the 
ends pursued in monstrous generation are subsumed to God’s ends. Particularly in 
Magirus is found an emphasis on the supremacy of God’s ends in monstrous births. 
He maintains that nature does not have the intention of producing “new and unusual 
forms,” which is to say something alien and distorted. The end of everything in 
55 Des Chene (1996) 171–177. See, for instance, the classification of ends offered by Rubio (1629) 
lib. 2, ca. viii, qu. unica, 280.
56 Recent studies show that the origin of this distinction dates back to Avicenna and was adopted in 
several ways by Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, etc., to give account of the 
generation of monsters, the rejection of void, etc. See Weill-Parot (2012) 15–38, Panti (2013) 
101–130, and Manzo (2013).
57 See Des Chene (1996) 143, n. 30; Mac Lean (2007) 236–247.
58 This approach has, of course, medieval antecedents. See, for instance, Aquinas (1975) lib. 3, ca. 
154, n. 11.
59 Aristotle (1998) II 8, 199a9–11, b18, 25–26. The sense of this formula is very similar with the 
sense of παρὰ φύσιν with respect to monstrosities in Generation of Animals, II 6, 745b9–11 
(“unless something contrary to nature [παρὰ φύσιν] occurs”); IV 8, 776a19–20.
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nature is God’s glory, which is the highest and universal end, for the sake of which 
everything is done.60 Like him, Eustachius claims that God seeks his glory, when he 
concurs with the cause that impedes the attainment of the regular end of generation. 
He argues that while monsters are beyond the intention of the impeded cause, they 
are not so with regard to the impeding cause, let alone regarding the intention of 
God, the supreme cause which commands the errors of nature for his greater glory.61 
Behind the claim that defective offspring involve God’s glory is the principle of 
plenitude, a world including the whole variety of regular and irregular beings can 
only be the work of the highest almighty creator.
Nonetheless, some manuals claim explicitly that when monsters are born, the 
world (understood as individuals, species, or the whole universe) is the beneficia-
ry.62 Burgersdijck’s strong naturalism goes along this line. He began by asking: 
since nature always acts toward an end, why should it not be so when it generates 
monsters? In ordinary generation, individuals tend to produce an effect like them-
selves aiming to preserve their species. In spite of this, when they are impeded in 
attaining that state, they intend by a secondary intention to produce an offspring 
completely resembling their form or soul, and as much as possible resembling their 
body or matter.63 Only the material aspect of the monstrous offspring is dissimilar 
to its progenitors. While its soul is like its parents’ soul (formal cause), its body is 
not. Accordingly, when nature makes monsters, it “does not frustrate its entire end 
[…], but only a part of it.”64 Now, Burgersdijck seems to suggest that, say, a two- 
headed horse, regardless of having a defective body, is still a horse because it has a 
horse’s form. Hence, to a certain extent the species horse as a whole is benefited by 
this state pursued by the secondary intention, for its form is maintained.
Keckermann seems to follow the same line, in admitting that nature only in part 
fails to obtain its ends in monstrous generation. When nature strives for generating 
natural bodies, it searches for perfect bodies, and not for aberrations or defects. But 
monsters cannot be themselves the ends of generation, because they are imperfect 
creatures. That leads him to the conclusion that when monsters are generated, nature 
only tends to what is perfect in them, but not to what is defective.65
Similarly, Rubio appeals to secondary intentions to argue that monstrous genera-
tion does good to nature. When the primary intention of particular causes cannot be 
achieved, secondary intentions are sought. He opposes the opinion of Suárez, 
according to which although with respect to particular causes monsters are causal 
effects, with respect to universal causes – that is, the heavens– monsters are 
60 Magirus (1646) lib. 1, ca. iii, 50–51; 55. It follows Velcurio (1538) sine folio [G8r?].
61 Eustachius (1647) trac. ii, dis. iii, qu. ii, 147.
62 I follow the terminology of the textbooks in using the singular “nature” to design different things: 
individuals (like the parents, the impeding nature, the impeded nature, etc.), the species (man, 
horse, etc.), and the whole of nature (sometimes identified as “the world,” “the universe,” and even 
metonymically the “heavens” to which the entire nature is submitted).
63 The resort to the concept of “secondary intention” has medieval antecedents, for instance, in 
Roger Bacon. See Panti (2013) 116–117.
64 Burgersdijck (1643) dis. XXIV, a. 2, i, 264–266. Cf. dis. XXIV, q. x, 350–351.
65 Keckermann (1623) lib.5, ca. iii, 595.
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intended per se. That is because, Rubio explains, while particular causes tend toward 
one certain goal and cannot tend per se toward contingent goals deviating from it, 
universal causes have a “larger extent and intention” (“maiorem ambitum, atque 
intentionem habentes”). On that basis, Rubio adds, Suárez’s thesis claims that “what 
cannot be intended per se by particular causes is intended by universal causes, under 
which the virtue of particular causes is contained.”66 Against Suárez, Rubio holds 
that monsters are intended not only by the universal causes but also by the particular 
causes concurring in the generation, albeit they pursue them by secondary intention. 
In Rubio’s account, we can observe that the individual primary end of the impeding 
cause (defective matter, small uterus, etc.), along with the collective ordinary end of 
parents, who strive for the preservation of the form of their species, are subsumed to 
the cosmic end pursued by the heavens which affects nature as whole. It is hard to 
imagine what might be the end pursued by impeding causes according to the Late 
Scholastics world image. Neither Rubio nor other commentators provide a positive 
answer to this question. We only find a negative answer: they do not seek a bad or 
defective effect by itself (in fact, no cause at all seeks for such effects).
Although Rubio does not explain what could be the benefit provided by monsters 
to nature as a whole, as we shall see, both he and Suárez argue that this cosmic end 
ultimately is warranted by God’s “consequent will.” God’s consequent will is what 
he wants for creatures in relation to their capacity, while God’s antecedent will is 
what he wants for creatures as far as he is concerned.67 Moreover, Suárez admits 
both alternatives that God wants to allow second causes to exert the motion that they 
are capable of (so they can achieve their individual or collective purposes) or wants 
to enhance the beauty of the universe through the diversity of creatures (in which 
case a cosmic end is desired).68 Pereira’s stance approaches Suárez’s last option by 
endorsing the principle of plenitude: God may have wanted monsters to exist so that 
the world would be complete by housing all kinds of beings, the necessary ones 
along with the contingent.69
On occasion, supporters of the position that the world is the beneficiary of mon-
strosities disputed their aesthetic value. Whereas some authors of the textbooks con-
sidered variety and plenitude as amounting to the world’s beauty, others claimed 
that, being ugly deformities and defects, monsters by no means could contribute to 
increased beauty. A case in point is Toledo, who holds that the diversity of things 
yields to beauty only if such diversity consists of perfect effects. Besides, he provides 
66 Rubio (1629) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. unica, 284. Cf. Suárez (1961) dis. XIX, sectio 12, n. 4. Rubio’s 
explanation of Suárez’ rationale omits the main point made in this passage, which ultimately sup-
ports Suárez’ claim concerning monsters: with respect to God, there are no casual effects in the 
universe.
67 This widespread distinction and terminology dates back to John Damascene (676–749). See 
Damascene (1955) II c. 29- PG 94, 969; 160. A similar distinction with another terminology is 
attributed to John Chrysostom (347–407).
68 Suárez (1961) dis. XXIII, Section 10, n. 11.
69 Pereira (1585) lib. 9, ca. x, 532.
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a teleological explanation in terms of impeding and impeded causes. Although the 
proximate efficient cause does not intend the monster as such, the impeding cause 
and the universal causes do intend it, since they produce that from which a monster 
necessarily ensues. In addition, divine concurrence is needed to attain the whole 
operation. God concurs with the strong causes strongly and with the weak causes 
weakly so that the concurrence with some causes is impeded by the concurrence 
with the other causes “not from the side of the concurrence but from the side of the 
causes.”70
A revealing illustrative example proposed by Toledo reflects the way in which 
the existence of monsters was interpreted as a type of internal conflict within nature, 
which reflects a conflict of ends. If an emperor has several subordinate kings who 
ask him for weapons which he gives them according to the condition of each one, 
then the weakest will be the one to fall in war. In this way, God, the supreme princi-
pal which sustains everything, gives operative virtues to all things and helps them to 
act in accordance with their own virtues. Of course, his goals play a role here, since 
God has given to all things a nature by which they are led unerringly to the God’s 
goals, even without foreseeing them. If the ends of both weak and strong causes 
respond to the providential plan of the divine ruler, God’s concurrence – accommo-
dated as it is to their unequal powers – simply accomplishes his plan. In other words, 
this concurrence allowing the occurrence of defective effects “fully corresponds to 
God’s providence.”71 Such a view is also in line with Suárez’s first alternative: God 
wants to benefit not the whole universe but individual agents by allowing them to 
exert their virtues.
Like Toledo’s, the Coimbra commentary also offers a sophisticated explanation 
of the way in which impediments intervene in monstrous generation. However, it 
differs considerably in its account of the beneficiary of the change and in maintain-
ing that they provide variety and increase the world’s beauty. If, for example, a two- 
headed horse is born, the impeded cause would be the parents, who try to engender 
a regular horse, whereas the impeding nature could be the excess of matter. Besides, 
the Coimbran commentary distinguishes three more components: the equine nature, 
the proximate ground (fundamentum proximum) of the deformity and the deformity 
itself or monstrosity. The impeded cause alone does not intend the monster: it is like 
a tradesman who desires to finish the work he is planning but is impeded from doing 
so. Neither is it intended by the impeding cause alone, since in the gestation of a 
monster there should necessarily be an impeded cause. That nature intends some 
effect means that it is inclined toward the realization of the effect that it produces. 
Since from the conjunction of the impeded and the impeding causes a monster is 
produced, then both causes as a whole (total cause) are directed toward the mon-
strosity as proximate ground of the deformity. Like Toledo, the Coimbrans appeal to 
God’s concurrence to complete this explanation. God intends monsters, not 
 immediately but through second causes (the impeded and the impeding causes) 
70 Toledo (1580) lib. 2, ca. iv, qu. xiii, fols. 76v–77r.
71 Ibid., qu. xiii, fols. 75v–77r.
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insofar as he concurs with them. The world as a whole is benefited by this deviated 
effect, since it becomes ornamented by diversity.72
4.6  For the Benefit of Human Souls: Monsters as Portents
The rationale provided by Case to arguing for the teleological value of monsters 
challenges Coimbran’s and Toledo’s and introduces the portentous interpretation of 
monsters to maintain that human souls are the ultimate beneficiary. He wonders how 
the Coimbrans can “confidently defend” that nature intends monsters on the basis of 
the distinction between impeded and impeding causes. Considered in relation to 
God, Case argues, there are neither impeding nor impeded causes, both being sim-
ply instruments of his will. Besides, Case rejects what would be Toledo’s stance, by 
affirming that if it is true that the impeded agent is not directed to a monstrous off-
spring, the same holds for the impeding cause. And that is because the end product 
is perfect and not defective with respect to the impeding cause, submitted as it is to 
God’s command.73
If it is true that Case is not the only author of manuals claiming that natural 
agents are God’s instruments, he shows nonetheless a remarkable difference of 
emphasis with respect to this point, by depicting nature as servant of God (ancilla 
dei) and by insisting on the fact that nature’s actions are determined (certa, fixa) by 
divine providence. His analysis of monster teleology therefore shifts from nature to 
God. In Case’s worldview, God rules and bends second causes in accordance with 
his free will and authority and uses “the truest causes” (verissimae causae) as instru-
ments designed to different ends. Certainly, if these causes work in a way different 
from the common order of nature, it seems to us that a monster is produced with 
respect to the particular nature, which tends toward the regular offspring. But with 
respect to God, who foreknows the causes and commands that these things should 
happen, this effect is not a monster, nor a bad, evil, or imperfect thing, but a proper 
piece of his perfect plan. Through things produced beyond the common course and 
intention of nature, God aims at announcing future evils to exhort human souls to 
seek for salvation. God does not intend the production of monsters as errors of 
nature as such but uses them to send moral warnings, messages to exhort human 
beings to keep divine moral precepts.74 In other words, human beings are the benefi-
ciaries of monstrous births, and monsters are signs which allow individuals to find 
out traces of the plan that God had designed for them.
The pioneering study by Céard maintained that conceptions of portent and 
wonders evolved together with naturalistic teratological traditions toward the 
 naturalization of monsters. Current studies agree that natural philosophers and 
72 Conimbricenses (1594) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. vi, art. i, 344–45 and art. ii, 346.
73 Case (1600a) lib. 2, ca. viii, 347–48; 363.
74 Case (1600a) lib. 2, ca. viii, 347–49. Ibid., 349: “potius clementer praemonere contendit de futu-
ris malis, quam monstrum intendere.” Cf. ibid., 346.
4 Monsters, Laws of Nature, and Teleology in Late Scholastic Textbooks
manzosa@yahoo.com.ar
78
physicians increasingly eschewed dealing with the moral and theological imports of 
monstrosities and regarded them simply as preternatural events requiring physical 
explanation, particularly by the 1670s. However, portentous narratives of monsters 
persisted in Europe well into the seventeenth century, though in large part dissoci-
ated from naturalistic accounts.75 Except for Case’s, most manuals of our survey 
broadly reflect this attitude: close to the Aristotelian naturalistic framework as they 
were, they either disregarded or explicitly rejected the interpretation of monsters as 
signs. Although in principle they did not point out a manifest contradiction between 
both lines, they intended to delimitate the realm properly belonging to the natural 
philosophical study of malformed offspring.
Such an attitude did not imply that theological matters should be completely 
excluded from naturalistic explanations. To the contrary, they were included as far 
as they were thought necessary to complete the account. A fortiori, the resulting 
causal narratives were developed so as not to collide with the essentials of theology. 
All the more so when the natural philosophical functions of God as first cause and 
designer of the world were enough to account for the origin of anomalous offspring, 
without taking in consideration the eventual moral and spiritual implications that 
monsters would involve. For Late Scholastics, this cooperation of second and first 
causes did not involve an unlawful intervention of theology into natural philosophy, 
but simply expressed the due harmony that they should maintain.76 Therefore, the 
omission of the portent interpretation from the naturalistic explanations did not 
entail that they resorted exclusively to secondary efficient and material causation 
and left aside, at the same time, final causes and divine providence. That is because 
Late Scholastics were convinced that the explanation of natural and preternatural 
events would be incomplete if finality were omitted.
Now, except for John Case, the finality alleged by our authors to complete their 
physical explanation did not attribute a portentous import to monstrosities. 
Concerning this particular point, we find the only remarkable though slight differ-
ence among Catholic and Protestant textbooks.77 In the case of Catholic textbooks, 
the lack of interest for monsters as portents becomes very explicit. Toledo’s exposi-
tion clearly expresses the natural philosophical focus in detriment to the interpreta-
tion of monsters as signs. While he takes in consideration the Ciceronian etymology 
of the word monstrum – as signifying to “show” and to “predict” things – he quickly 
dismisses it, by arguing that it has scarcely anything to do with his aim of explaining 
the causes of monsters and their relation to nature’s teleology.78 The rest of the 
Catholic authors do not analyze the portentous meaning at all.
75 See Céard (1996) 3–7. Daston and Park initially (1981) agreed with Céard’s opinion but later 
(1998, 173–177) advocated the coexistence of several sensibilities which overlapped across the 
centuries. Later studies support this last view. See, for instance, Bates (2005b) 132–134.
76 On the causal cooperation, see Witmore (2001) 133.
77 Bates (2005b) 65 and passim ch. 3 had claimed that Protestant narratives were more engaged 
with the interpretation of monsters as portents than the Catholic accounts. However, his study 
compares works very different in genre – sixteenth- and seventeenth-century medical learned texts 
and popular literature – and does not analyze the textbook genre considered in this paper.
78 Toledo (1580) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. xiii, fol. 76r.
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Things were different in the Protestant context, since the function of monsters as 
portents suited perfectly well with Protestant preoccupation with divine providence. 
Given that Protestantism maintained, on the one hand, that the recovery of human 
post-lapsarian depravity depended entirely upon divine mercy and, on the other, did 
not establish intermediaries linking God with the individual souls, Protestant men 
and women were anxious to learn whether God had chosen them as elect. Thus, the 
interpretation of the signs of the divine plan in individuals’ lives and in natural 
events became a central concern and had a wide range of religious, political, and 
social uses. Within this pattern, rare and extraordinary offspring were regarded as 
carrying messages concerning individual salvation and collective future.79
Accordingly, Protestant textbooks show a greater concern with the theological 
meaning of monsters as God’s signs. Yet, we can recognize that even in these cases 
the interest was increasingly diminishing toward the end of the sixteenth century. 
This is noticeable in our selected corpus. If by the middle of the sixteenth century 
both Velcurio and Melanchthon admitted the value of monsters as portents, by the 
end of the same century only Case adopted a similar view.80 As for Burgersdijck’s 
long and detailed exposition, he judged it necessary to analyze this line of interpre-
tation – so important and widespread in the Protestant world– and to refute it from 
a strictly “scientific” point of view supported by the following two reasons: on the 
one hand, it is not always the case that after the generation of a monster, something 
unusual occurs; on the other hand, there is no verified “physical” connection, nei-
ther of monsters as causes nor of monsters as effects with the events allegedly signi-
fied by them.81 Finally, Keckermann’s and Magirus’s sketchier treatments – dealing 
with the essential points of teratology as they were – do not say anything about 
monsters as portents.
I think that the exceptional position of Case, as compared to the remaining 
Protestant authors, should be interpreted in the light of peculiarities of the religious, 
social, and intellectual English background. There, the presence of providentialism 
was more outstanding than in other Protestant areas, in large part due to the Puritans, 
which have been called the “hotter sort” of providentialists.82 This context might 
have influenced Case to assert the portentous meaning of monsters.
79 On concepts of providence in early modern Protestantism, see Van der Molen (1978) and 
Donagan (1981) 385–386.
80 Velcurio (1558) lib. I, ca. v, 21–22; Melanchton (1565) fol. 152v defines monsters as: “Prodigia 
[…] seu species, seu res natas praeter naturae ordinem, quae aliquid significant.” See also fols. 
152v–155v. Goclenius’s (1613) 708–709 informed by his irenic attitude as it is, gathers several 
traditions and presents monsters as preternatural and contranatural facts, much closer to 
Melanchton’s treatment.
81 Burgersdijck (1643) dis. XXIV, a. 2, i., 261.
82 I quote the expression of Walsham, who adapting a classic formulation of Patrick Collinson 
claims – against other interpretations – that providentialism was a mark of Protestantism in gen-
eral, and not exclusively of Puritanism. See Walsham (1999) 3–4, and passim. For an alternative 
view, see Thomas (1971), ch. 4, esp. 109. On monsters and providence in England, see, for 
instance, Walsham (1999) passim and Crawford (2005).
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4.7  Chance, Second Causes, and Providence
Since Aristotle pointed out that monsters are παρὰ φύσιν and accidentally caused, 
many interpreters drew the conclusion that they are produced by chance. Debates on 
chance became, therefore, an integral part of teratology at least until the eighteenth 
century.83 To the textbook authors, this point was of central interest, for if chance 
could be considered the cause of monsters, this would be interpreted as a limitation 
of God’s wisdom and power and could even be seen as a suspension of his provi-
dence.84 Most manuals reduce chance events to causes per se, in the same vein as 
Melanchthon or Aquinas had done. Melanchthon is very explicit about this; acci-
dental causes, like chance and fortune, derive from at least six kinds of non- 
accidental (per se) causes: God and angels, evil spirits, temperaments, celestial 
tendencies, man’s behavior, and matter’s instability.85 While agreeing with the gen-
eral attitude of reducing the generation of monsters to non-accidental causes which 
pursue an end, most textbooks show interesting variations of emphasis in explaining 
how such a reduction operates.
An extreme position denies the very existence of chance by arguing that God’s 
providence makes it impossible and by strongly emphasizing that every natural phe-
nomenon is submitted to God’s plan and rule. No room is given to any level of 
autonomy in nature’s changes, so that nature becomes a mere assistant to divine 
goals. No wonder, Case represents this stance. He argues that “if God exists, chance 
does not exist.” Although philosophers have claimed that many things in nature 
happen “contingently according to an unfixed law” (incerta lege contingenter), 
strictly speaking casus et fortuna are no more than names, since they are not “true 
and real causes.” God’s providence may be “latent and occult,” but it is “a certain, 
fixed, and determined cause.” Explanations that appeal to chance and fortune are, 
therefore, spurious and ignorant. Everything acts according to the divine majesty, 
which had ornamented the world with variety and had “established laws” (legesque 
sanxit). Thus, he commanded that every individual observe the same order and the 
law of nature assigned to its species. When a monster is generated, the particular 
nature makes a mistake, but the universal nature does not. The universal nature, 
which is singled out by the first cause, is “fixed” by God’s providence. To a Christian 
philosopher, Case concludes, the only “true and real causes” are God and divine 
providence, nature being God’s “minister.”86 Albeit his apparent indifference toward 
Protestantism or Catholicism, Case argues in a way which approaches the Philippist 
emphasis on providence, aiming at demonstrating that absolutely everything was 
83 On discussions of chance in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century teratology, see, for instance, 
Bitbol-Hespéries (2005) and Ibrahim (2005) 169–186.
84 The textbooks talk of fortuna, which is proper to beings which have the capacity to choose, and 
casus – which corresponds to beings that cannot make choices (to which monsters belong). See 
Aristotle (1998) II 6, 197a36–198a13.
85 Kusukawa (1995) 155–157; eadem (2008) 112–113.
86 Case (1600b) ca. iii, 20; ca viii, 50–55; id. (1600a) lib. 2, ca. viii, 339, 347; lib. 2, ca. vi, 317.
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made and ruled by God.87 Keckermann seems to endorse a similar view with respect 
to the last point. Provided that nature is “God’s effect or force,” both God and nature 
direct their actions toward a good, which is its end. By the same token, there is no 
casual action in nature, but every action aims at a fixed and determined goal.88
Other authors maintain an intermediate and more nuanced position that, without 
denying that chance is an accidental cause, claims that, with respect to God’s provi-
dence, nothing is random. Eustachius defines chance as an accidental cause in those 
things that happen beyond the intention of the agent and rarely. This is to be consid-
ered so only from the human point of view and regarding second causes by them-
selves. Nonetheless, there is nothing casual with respect to God, who through the 
straightforward plan of his providence always rules the concurrence of second 
causes toward the production of their effects. Close to this view, Magirus maintains 
that sometimes nature is impeded, so that accidentally (by chance) it does not attain 
the end that it pursues. But again, chance and fortune are accidental causes that must 
ultimately be reduced to the goals of God’s providence.89
The Coimbra commentary makes a similar point: chance and fortune are acci-
dental causes, but, with respect to God, nothing occurs fortuitously or randomly 
since nothing escapes the rule of his providence. As for monsters, its explanation 
distinguishes between the particular intention of the second causes and the universal 
intention of the first cause. While it can be said that there is an element of chance 
regarding the impeded cause, as far as the intention of God is concerned, there can 
be no chance, given that he is provident and foreknows everything. Similarly, Rubio 
maintains that monsters are random effects only with respect to the primary inten-
tion of natural causes but are not so with respect to their secondary intention. 
Moreover, there is no natural effect which is purely accidental (“pure casualis, vel 
omnino per accidens”). Finally, if we understand by nature the first cause, which 
produces, rules, and directs toward the production of their effects both particular 
and universal causes, “it is true and necessary that monsters are neither accidental 
nor random, but per se effects.” To support this claim, Rubio – like the Coimbrans 
and Suárez– appeals to the distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent 
will.90 When God concurs with the impeded cause, he wants the regular offspring 
with his “antecedent and inefficient” will, so that he tends toward the production of 
a perfect outcome. Nonetheless, his concurrence is “accommodated” to the power 
of second causes. As a result, when there is an impediment which is stronger than 
the particular cause aiming the perfect offspring, God wants efficiently (efficaciter 
vult) the generation of the defective outcome with an “absolute and efficient will.”91
87 On Melanchthon’s view of providence, see Kusukawa (1995)160–162.
88 Keckermann (1623) lib.1, ca. iv, 18.
89 Eustachius (1647) Pars Physica, trac. ii, dis. iii, qu. ii, 146–47; Magirus (1646) lib. 1, ca. iii, 51, 
55–57.
90 On the notions of God’s antecedent and consequent will, see above p. 15 of pdf 
91 Conimbricenses (1594) lib. 2, ca. vii, qu. i, art. i, 236–37; Rubio (1629) lib. 2, ca. ix, qu. unica, 
286–288. Cf. Suárez (1961) dis. XXIII, sectio 10, n. 11, and Conimbricenses (1594) lib. 2, ca. ix, 
qu. vi, art. ii, 336.
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Finally, a third stance – represented by Toledo, Pereira, and Burgersdijck – 
diverges a little from the last one, by underlining the role of second causes in the 
whole analysis. This provides the basis for a more autonomous depiction of 
nature – a bit closer to the new science – within which natural changes are explained 
in terms of the intrinsic properties of nature.92 Thus, Toledo devotes a long analysis 
to the notions of chance and fortune and claims that monsters are the result of 
chance, which is to say that they are effects that accidentally and rarely follow from 
an “intrinsic natural principle” or “internal cause,” for instance, matter. Chance and 
fortune are accidental efficient causes, whose effects can be called fortuitous or 
accidental only with respect to particular causes. Although they are not intended by 
them, they are foreseen by God, and, if they are natural effects, they are pursued by 
the universal causes (the heavens). Toledo holds that although monstrosities are 
random effects of particular causes, they are not random with respect to the “univer-
sal generator,” i.e., the heavenly substances and their motors, “since such matter 
from which monsters are produced is disposed to such monstrous shape” by celes-
tial influence.93 The heavens intend that which is arranged by such a matter, so that 
from such a matter under certain circumstances, such effect will be necessarily 
produced.
Toledo’s stance shows interesting contrasts with the authors previously consid-
ered. In his long treatment of chance and fortune, the words providentia and volun-
tas do not appear. While he refers very briefly to God’s prescience, the core of his 
argument lies in the analysis of efficient second causes. He agrees with the above 
examined authors in claiming that monsters are effects of chance only with respect 
to particular agents, when he adds that in another sense they are not accidental 
effects. Nevertheless, he relies on celestial influence (rather than on God’s provi-
dence and will) which lies within the natural world in connection with the necessity 
proper to efficient causation. His closeness to the later natural philosophical devel-
opment, however, should not be exaggerated, since divine providence indeed main-
tains a role in Toledo’s depiction of nature. In another question of the same chapter, 
he endorses the view that everything in nature works for an end and argues that 
“glorious God” is the one universal and provident cause which has provided to 
every nature an end.94 Once again, we can see that the views of the textbook authors 
differ in emphasis rather than in substantial contents.
In keeping with this third position, Pereira’s stance on chance in monstrous gen-
eration is based on nature’s operations. Not that he denies that everything in nature 
is ruled and foreknown by God, but his explanation is more related with second 
efficient causes. Even longer than Toledo, Pereira devotes the whole book nine of 
his manual to fortune, chance, and contingence. He makes it clear that it is a very 
“obscure and ambiguous” question whether in sublunary things there could be a 
92 In particular, Jesuits Toledo and Pereira attributed more autonomy to nature with respect to its 
Creator. For Toledo, see Des Chene (1996) 207–208. For Pereira, see Landucci (2006) ch. 6, esp. 
4–84.
93 Toledo (1580) lib. 2, ca. iv, qu. x, fols. 66r–69v. Ibid., fol. 67v.
94 Ibid., fols. 67v; 75v.
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natural effect said to occur at random with respect to heavenly substances. After 
exposing arguments pro and contra, he concludes that if the actual concurrence of 
the heavens is necessary to produce sublunary effects, nothing in the sublunary 
world can occur randomly with respect to them. Moreover, with respect to God’s 
providence, there is nothing caused by chance and fortune. Only with respect to 
second and particular causes, it can be said that there are fortuitous and random 
effects. Consequently, Pereira admits that monsters are produced by chance only in 
a restrictive sense (secundum quid) as they occur rarely and are not intended as such 
(per se) but accidentally (per accidens), not on account of something but by the 
necessity and disorder of matter, which prevents nature from following its ordinary 
course and forces it to generate another outcome. To Pereira, the more acceptable 
opinion is the one according to which monsters are not caused by chance, but per se 
on the basis that their causes are “determined per se, fixed and understood by sci-
ence.” Like Toledo, he maintains that although the causes of monsters are rare, when 
they are present, the monstrosity necessarily occurs. In fact, once nature is impeded 
to achieve its end, it turns back all its power and produces monsters. Pereira assumes 
that every natural effect depends on fixed causes (certae causae) whose time, modes, 
and other circumstances are prescribed by nature (a natura praefinito constitutae).95
An emphasis on second causes is also found in Burgersdijck, who asserts that 
nature has “its power from another source and employs it not by chance but by a 
constant and fixed reason.” As for the “force” by which nature is led to its end, he 
rejects as a great ignorance the view that attributes it to matter, chance, and fortune. 
In contrast, he agrees with Aristotle in ascribing to celestial bodies the power of 
altering, generating, corrupting, and changing inferior natures. Heavenly bodies 
move in different ways to distribute this power to inferior bodies. However, since 
nothing is moved by itself, but by others, the causal series of motion requires a start 
which consists in an unmoved physical principle. On the other hand, as far as the 
efficient process is concerned, nature does not tend toward the attainment of its end 
randomly and disorderly, but with order and skill. This being so, the generation of 
things is able to be referred to chance and fortune only so far, and that it must ulti-
mately be established that nothing in nature is generated by chance. Burgersdijck 
admits that monsters can seem to be made by a disorderly nature and at random. 
Nonetheless, he obscurely argues, they are not nature’s intentions, neither can they 
be attributed to nature as their efficient cause, but by accident. Monsters are works 
of a nature that is impeded by a hindering force or by matter’s incapacity. This 
seems to mean that nature as a process does not act randomly: monsters do not origi-
nate from chance (non temere) but from a determined and fixed end (destinato ac 
certo fine).96
Throughout these three general stances concerning this central point of the 
discussion of the modal character of monsters, we find a range from an extreme 
providentialist view of nature (Case) – which heavily subordinates secondary 
causation to God – to views that give a more prominent role to secondary causation 
95 Pereira (1585) lib. 9, ca. ii, 511 and ca. iv, 516; ca. ii, 511; ca. x, 531–532.
96 Burgersdijck (1643) dis. iv, q. x, 40–41; q. xii, 41–42.
4 Monsters, Laws of Nature, and Teleology in Late Scholastic Textbooks
manzosa@yahoo.com.ar
84
(Toledo, Pereira, and Burgersdijck), passing through an intermediary position in 
which the cooperation between secondary and primary causation is more equili-
brated (Eustachius, Magirus, Rubio, and the Coimbrans).
4.8  Final Remarks: From “Weak” to “Strong” Laws 
of Nature
The textbooks show a preoccupation with the relation of monsters to nature’s teleol-
ogy, but do not express the same concern with their relation to nature’s regularity. In 
these accounts, monsters do not represent a challenge to nature’s regularity, since 
the nomological order includes the possibility of exceptions. Transgressions of the 
“weak” laws of nature – like monsters – are therefore easily admitted in such a 
metaphysical framework: both the regular course and the exceptions are part of the 
world order. For this reason, we do not find any differences in the selected texts 
regarding this issue.
In contrast, monsters seem to defy the metaphysical tenet that nature always acts 
toward an end. Hence, the authors seek for arguments to support the view that ulti-
mately monsters are not counterexamples to nature’s omnipresent finality. Whereas 
the textbooks here explored agree in this starting point, they elaborate, however, 
different argumentative strategies to reconcile the existence of monsters with 
“strong” finality. The alternative solutions given to the issue of teleology cross the 
broad Protestant-Catholic divide. That will not come as a surprise, given the high 
influence that certain Catholic manuals exerted over Protestant Late Scholasticism. 
One must add, however, that in some cases the preeminence that divine providence 
had played in Protestantism probably contributed toward the endorsement of the 
portentous interpretation of monsters recognized in the Oxford scholar John Case – 
curiously suspected of Catholicism– or toward a greater preoccupation with taking 
a position on this question as manifested by Franco Burgersdijck.
I tried to show that the metaphysical background of the Late Scholastic treatment 
of monsters combined a “weak” sense of nature’s regularity with a “strong” sense 
of nature’s finality. The main concern of these authors was not so much why mon-
sters are irregular, but what the end pursued by them is. Whereas a weak regularity 
permits exceptions to the generative process of living beings, a strong finality does 
not admit unintended products of nature. As a result, the existence of monsters was 
often thought as the articulation of weak laws of nature with ends which are ulti-
mately inescapable: if under certain circumstances some ends cannot be attained, 
other ends are achieved instead of them. Being the masterpiece of a divine designer, 
nature always acts toward an end.
Certainly, the assumption of strong finality involved conceptual difficulties for 
Late Scholastic authors. One symptom of this is the fact that they hardly provide 
clues about the goals that impeding causes would seek which prevent the comple-
tion of regular generation. They only assert that impediments (like anything else in 
nature) do not tend toward imperfection. Now, if they do not strive for a defective 
outcome, what do they strive for? Some authors hold that heavens, as universal 
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causes, intend monsters. Now, what kind of benefit would defective beings provide 
to the world? Is diversity/beauty the only good that they can provide? That sounds 
quite unconvincing, at least to our contemporary eyes. Be that as it may be, it seems 
that Late Scholastics felt more confident in accounting for the regular ends sought 
by nature always or for the most part, or even accounting for God’s ends, than 
explaining what good could be provided by nature’s defects.
Another uneasy point regards the apparent sufficiency of efficient causes in 
exhausting scientific explanation, which would entail that appeals to ends are unnec-
essary. To most of the authors here considered – except perhaps for Case – efficient 
causes necessitate their effects. However, they still felt the need to dwell on the issue 
of the intention behind monstrosity to provide a complete scientific explanation of 
natural effects. The role ascribed to efficient causes and the attention paid to teleol-
ogy sometimes show tensions inside their stances, particularly in the case of Toledo, 
Pereira, Keckermann, the Coimbrans, and Burgersdijck. If generation is described 
as a complex process combining different efficient causes, the postulation of indi-
vidual, collective, cosmic, or divine ends pursued in the generation process looks 
like a rather superfluous or even contrived addition to an already satisfactory expla-
nation. The more so when the ultimate teleological reason claims something quite 
obvious in an orthodox Christian view: every occurrence in nature – a monster as 
well as whatever regular production– is intended by God. Nonetheless, even if these 
authors seem to be to a certain point congenial with the path of efficient causes, it 
remains true that they did not abandon the path of finality, since, as Des Chene has 
rightly noted, to them it was inconceivable that natural changes should not have 
ends.97 Moreover, they designed a sophisticated doctrine of nature’s finality along 
with a complex hierarchy of ends that could coexist with explanations in terms of 
efficient causes. Far from assuming a mitigated teleology or no design at all – as Ian 
Maclean had suggested –98 they were still committed to strong finality by appealing 
to diversified and multilayered kinds of ends. That this commitment to omnipresent 
teleology increasingly involved hard hermeneutic problems, as the case of monsters 
remarkably shows, may be one reason for its later and slow decline.
Despite the many changes undergone by natural science and the world picture in 
the early modern period usually associated with the “Scientific Revolution,” the 
above-studied topics continued to be present well into the eighteenth century in 
discussions of monsters. At an early stage, for instance, some of them persisted in 
one of the branches of Francis Bacon’s natural history, the “history of pretergenera-
tions.” Bacon depicted the facts to be collected in this branch as “the works of nature 
which have a digression and deflection from the ordinary course of generations, 
productions, and motions.” He also called such works “errors of nature” for which 
matter was the main culprit: they occur whenever nature is “quite forced to and 
ripped from its state by the deformities and rarities of obstinate and rebellious 
 matter, and by the violence of impediments.”99 Within the Baconian physical and 
97 Des Chene (1996) 169.
98 Maclean (2000) 233.
99 Bacon (2000) 63 and (1996) 100.
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metaphysical framework, the “errors,” “impediments,” and “rebellious matter” 
reproduce the Late Scholastic terminology indeed but keep only part of their 
original meaning.
A generation later, Descartes defied the Late Scholastic narrative even further. In 
his Primae cogitationes circa generationem animalium (posthumously published in 
1701), he explained the birth of hermaphrodites by resorting to secondary material 
and efficient causes and remarked that these are not “trivial [levis] causes” but actu-
ally the most momentous, “the eternal laws of nature.”100 Similar nomological 
explanations of teratogeny became more common throughout the seventeenth and 
the eighteenth centuries. For instance, Robert Boyle maintained that “when mon-
sters are said to be preternatural things, the expression is to be understood in regard 
to that particular species from which the monster does enormously deviate, though 
the causes, that produce that deviation, act but according to the general laws whereby 
things corporeal are guided.”101 In the same line, Nicolas Malebranche argued that 
if “a child comes into the world with a malformed head growing from his breast and 
which makes him wretched (…), it is because [God] has established laws for the 
communication of motions, of which these effects are necessary consequences.”102 
George Berkeley addressed the same issue in holding that “[n]atural productions 
(…) are not all equally perfect.” Moreover, they are explained by “general rules” 
from whose “constant observation (…) natural evils will some times unavoidably 
ensue.”103 The explanations of monsters by Descartes, Boyle, Malebranche, and 
Berkeley did not share the same metaphysical and theological assumptions about 
causation and the relation of nature to God, but agreed in subordinating monsters to 
inviolable laws of nature.
Whereas Late Scholastic accounts explained the birth of monsters by claiming 
that nature’s primary and regular intentions were replaced by secondary ones, mod-
ern accounts argued that irregular offspring are explained by a set of inviolable laws, 
distinct from those which applied to regular offspring. However, despite this new 
nomological approach, older patterns of thought were still an integral part of early 
modern teratology. The long and intense discussions maintained at the Parisian 
Académie des Sciences still debated – as Late Scholastic manuals did– whether 
monsters were exceptions to God’s laws of nature and, if so, whether they pursued 
an end.104
Although scholarly studies have shown that there was not a homogeneous 
view of the laws of nature in early modern natural philosophies,105 beyond their 
common assumptions, early modern philosophers generally thought that laws of 
100 Descartes (1909) 523–524; cf. Excerpta, ib. 584.
101 Boyle (1996) section VII, 109.
102 Malebranche (1976) vol. V, 32. I quote the English translation Malebranche (1992) 118.
103 Berkeley (1953) #256, 121–122. On Malebranche and Berkeley, see Adams (2013) and Schmaltz 
(2013).
104 On the querelle des monstres held in the Académie des Sciences’s during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, see, for instance, Roger (1997) 318–336, Monti (2000), and Bitbol-Hespériès 
(2012).
105 See Roux, (2001); Steinle (1995).
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nature –being statements that codify regularities observed in nature –106 determined 
a regularity in nature and were applicable without exceptions.107 In cases where a 
phenomenon was not explained by a certain law, it could be explained by other laws, 
which possessed either the same or greater degree of generality, but which might be 
unknown to us. Such a view entailed new theoretical difficulties: assuming invari-
able laws raised the problem of the existence of miracles, insofar as they are inter-
ruptions of the regular course of nature. Interruptions within nature – which caused 
debates long into the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries–were not as 
problematic for late Scholastics.
The Late Scholastic assumption of a purposive nature (strong finality) entailed 
the possibility of preternatural errors (nature’s fallibility) and in large part supported 
the notion of weak laws of nature admitting exceptions. Hence, one can suggest that 
the tendency of some relevant trends of the new science to reject the explanatory 
value of strong view of finality would play as an important concomitant factor, 
though not the one, permitting the transformation of the concept of laws of nature 
into exception less regularities. In a program like Descartes’ which – consistently or 
not– eliminates final causes from the scientific explanation,108 strong finality is no 
longer taken for granted, and nature’s fallibility does not make sense any more. 
Against this backdrop, laws of nature may be thought as inviolable and 
unbreakable.
A broader study will be needed to support this point, but bearing in mind the 
textbook views here explored, one can suggest that the exception less character of 
the laws of nature proposed by the natural philosophers who were influenced by this 
background can be interpreted as a displacement of the strength that Late 
Scholasticism ascribed to teleology toward natural regularity. In other words, early 
modern laws of nature assume the regularity and order of nature, but at the same 
time abandon the teleological framework inherited from Late Scholasticism, either 
by excluding final causes from scientific explanations, or by arguing that God’s ends 
are beyond the scope of human knowledge, or by suggesting the nonexistence of 
ends. In this way, the strong character which Late Scholastic textbooks ascribed to 
teleology was transferred to nature’s regularity.109 The displacement would lead 
106 I follow here John Henry’s interpretation, in Henry (2004) 79. 
107 On the exception less character of the laws of nature, see Maclean (2008) 29 and Roux (2001) 
and eadem (2008) 200.
108 Descartes (1905) book I # 28, 15. On Descartes’ inconsistencies in his rejection of final causes, 
see Gaber (1992) 338–339, n. 14.
109 This reading would provide further evidence in support of Lynn Joy’s contentions, which take 
issue with one of John Milton’s claims in Milton (1998). Joy holds two theses: (1) “Aristotle’s 
conception of causal explanation—while in many ways incompatible with explanations based on 
laws of nature and material efficient causes—actually served as the source of certain definitive 
features of this modern conception of scientific explanation”; (2) “the decline of explanations in 
terms of the four causes occurred not because the new conception of scientific explanation was 
shown to be rationally superior to Aristotle’s conception but because the latter had been seriously 
weakened by the efforts of its early modern defenders to rehabilitate it.” See Joy (2006) 73 (italics 
in the original).
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Descartes and others finally to refuse the inherited concept of monsters, by showing 
that, after all, they are not errors at all, but natural events in accordance with excep-
tion less laws of nature.
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